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Copenhagen Accord and Cancún Agreements to 2030. Specific features compared to earlier
assessments are the explicit consideration of near-term 2030 emission targets as well as the
systematic sensitivity analysis for the availability and potential of mitigation technologies. Our
estimates show that a 2030 mitigation effort comparable to the pledges would result in a
further “lock-in” of the energy system into fossil fuels and thus impede the required energy
transformation to reach low greenhouse-gas stabilization levels (450 ppm CO2e). Major
implications include significant increases in mitigation costs, increased risk that low
stabilization targets become unattainable, and reduced chances of staying below the proposed
temperature change target of 2 °C in case of overshoot. With respect to technologies, we find
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1 The extension of the Kyoto Protocol implied tha
Parties joined the Protocol and that their targets co
ambition pledges that were made in Cancún.
9K. Riahi et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 8–23risks that some currently optional technologies, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) or
the large-scale deployment of bioenergy, will become “a must” by 2030.
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. IntroductionLimiting climate change has been the subject of interna-
tional negotiations for more than 20 years. In this process,
long-term aspirational goals have been identified by the Parties
to the UNFCCC with more than 190 countries supporting goals
to keep global temperature rise to below 2 °C compared to
pre-industrial times [1]. Achieving this objective requires a
fundamental transformation of the energy and other green-
house gas emitting sectors in order to reduce emissions and
to stabilize their concentrations in the atmosphere [2–6]. A
globally comprehensive agreement with binding emission
limits to achieve this goal is currently lacking. Instead, the
Kyoto Protocol has been extended and countries have made
pledges to reduce their emissions in the near term, i.e. by 2020,
first as part of the Copenhagen Accord, later anchored in the
2010 Cancún Agreements [7].1 The countries with pledges
represent about 80% of current global emissions [8].
The implications of the near-term pledges for the feasibility
and costs of long-term targets are poorly understood. Previous
studies indicate that the emissions resulting from the pledges
would be higher than the least-cost emission pathways of most
scenarios reaching 2 °C (e.g. [9,10]). This is, for instance, assessed
in the UNEP Emissions Gap Reports [8,11] and inHöhne et al. [12].
The pledges correspond thus to a relatively modest climate policy
signal, leading in the near-term to an “emission gap” compared to
optimal pathways toward 2 °C [13]. The explicit analysis of the
long-term consequences of this emission gap has, with a few
notable exceptions [14–16], not been conducted at this time.
In this paper we present an overview of the AMPERE
model comparison with focus on the implications of modest
short-term policies to 2030. In this context, we assess the
emission consequences of the pledges for the year 2020, and
specifically explore the implications if the policy stringency of
the pledges would continue to the year 2030. In total nine
international integrated assessment modeling teams have
participated in the model comparison and developed a set of
more than 300 scenarios based on harmonized assumptions
about the pledges and other factors (see Section 2 onmethods).
The diversity of modeling approaches permits us to cover a wide
range of dynamics and to explicitly explore uncertainty owing to
structural as well as parametric differences between the models.
Our paper is complemented by a second AMPERE modeling
comparison exploring the implications of different regional
accession rules for long-term climate policy objectives [17]. In
addition, a series of papers in this issue present insights of
individual modeling teams in greater detail [18–22].
Stabilizing global temperatures requires a limit on the
cumulative amount of long-lived greenhouse gases emitted
to the atmosphere [23–26]. Any lack of emission mitigation
over the near termwill need to be compensated thus by more
stringent and more rapid emission reductions later in thet only some Annex-I
rrespond to the low-century. Key questions addressed in the paper are, therefore,
whether the “gap” can still be closed and long-term targets
be attained if the world delayed stringent policies up to
2030? What are the implications for the pace of the future
energy transformation, considering particularly the inertia of
the system against rapid changes? How would the overall
costs of mitigation be affected, and which technologies might
be critical for bridging the near-term emission gap?
A distinguishing feature of our modeling comparison is the
explicit consideration of short-term targets in order to explore
trade-offs between the required near-term emission mitiga-
tion, and their consequences for the attainability of alternative
climate targets in the long term. We specifically focus on the
2030 time-frame for the short-term targets. This time-frame
is of high policy relevance as our analysis could provide
important guidance for the required stringency of post-2020
targets on which the negotiations will need to increasingly
focus during the coming years. For an assessment with focus
on the 2020 time-frame see [27–30].
Choices about mitigation technologies as well as society's
ability to limit energy demand play a critical role for the
nature, direction, and attainable pace of the energy transfor-
mation and associated greenhouse gas emission reductions
[2,15,31–35]. We thus conduct also a systematic technology
sensitivity analysis and explore the implications if the
deployment of certain mitigation technologies would be-
come more restricted compared to their full potential. These
restrictions reflect possible political choices with respect
to more controversial options, such as nuclear or carbon
capture and storage (CCS) (see, e.g., [36,37]), but can also be
the result of technical or other implementation barriers
(e.g., variable renewable energy that may face challenges
with respect to systems integration [38,39], or biomass that
may face restrictions due to competition over land [40]). The
analysis of supply-side technologies is complemented by a
sensitivity analysis on the demand-side to better understand
the potential contribution of efficiency and energy intensity
improvements. The technology sensitivity cases were closely
coordinated with the parallel ongoing modeling comparison
of the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF27) [41].
In this paper, we first describe methods and scenario
design (Section 2), and then turn to the critical question of
the implications of alternative near-term policies for the
timing of mitigation and greenhouse gas emission pathways.
Section 3 explores consequences for the required pace of the
energy transformation, and Section 4 examines costs and
feasibility issues. Section 5 concludes.2. Methodology and scenario design
Our study employs nine different global integrated assess-
ment models of the economy with alternative representations
of the main greenhouse gas emitting sectors. We use the
models for the development of a set of long-term climate
stabilization scenarios for the 21st century.
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our scenarios consider a combination of different short-term
and long-term targets, which divide the century-scale time
horizon of the scenarios into two stages. During the first
stage up to the year 2030, global emissions are required to
follow a trajectory toward a 2030 emission target. After 2030,
emissions are constrained further to stay within a cumulative
emission budget for the full century (2000–2100) in order to
achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
long-term. In this set-up, the amount of cumulative emissions
that may be vented to the atmosphere in the second stage (after
2030)will critically depend on the short-term emission pathway
to 2030. The distinct separation of the time-frames helps us to
explicitly assess the consequences of actions over the short-term
for the attainability and costs of long term objectives. This makes
our study also different from the majority of earlier assessments
that primarily focused on stabilization scenarios with “optimal”
timing of the mitigation efforts [8,11].
2.1. Short-term emission targets
For deriving the short-term targets, we estimated the
resulting global GHG emission levels from the pledges by 2020
and extrapolated themitigation effort to 2030 (see Supplemen-
tarymaterial). The estimated emissions of the pledges are based
on den Elzen et al. [42]. Global emissions resulting from the
pledges are subject to uncertainty, since some country pledges
are coupled to conditions (such as financial support or action by
other countries) or are defined relative to an uncertain business
as usual path [8]. We use two common interpretations of the
pledges for deriving “High” and “Low” emission targets for the
year 2020. Our low emission target corresponds to a so-called
conditional casewhere all pledges become fully implemented at
a high level of ambition. The high emission target assumes
implementation of the unconditional and low-ambition pledges
only (see the Supplementary material for further detail). As a
second step we extrapolate the global mitigation stringency
of the 2020 pledges to derive the corresponding emission
targets for the year 2030. This translates into a “Low” short-term
greenhouse gas emission target growing from presently around
50 GtCO2e to about 51 GtCO2e by 2020 and reaching 53 GtCO2e
by 2030. Emissions in the “High” pledge target are around
55 GtCO2e in 2020, and increase to 61 GtCO2e by 2030. The
pledges lead to 2030 emissions that are lower than emissions
under business as usual conditions (Fig. 1A).2
2.2. Long-term emission targets
We adopt two long term targets corresponding to the
objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at
450 and 550 ppm CO2e. The 450 ppm CO2e corresponds to2 The extrapolation of the global emissions of the pledges to 2030 requires an
assessment of the equivalentmitigation effort of the 2020 pledges for the future.
We rely for this purpose on the distribution of the550 ppmCO2-e scenarios from
AMPERE,which per design depict a continuation of equivalent effort over time to
reach a long-term target. For the extrapolation between 2020 and 2030 we
assume that global emissions would continue along the respective percentile
pathway of the full distribution of the 550 ppm scenarios between 2020 and
2030. We further consider the emission reductions from the baseline in 2020 in
order to assess the equivalent global emission levels by 2030. For further details
see the supplementary material.about the lowest greenhouse gas emission scenarios in the
literature [43] broadly consistent with keeping long-term
temperature change below 2 °C compared to pre-industrial
levels [44]. The 550 ppm CO2e explores a target with
intermediate stringency. While all modeling frameworks in
our study cover CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industrial
sources (themain contributor to anthropogenic climate change)
only a limited set of models also cover emissions from the
land-use sector and/or the full suite of greenhouse gases,
including non-CO2 GHGs and emissions of other radiatively
and chemically active substances (such as aerosols from black
carbon or sulfur). Previous studies indicate that cumulative CO2
emission budgets for 2000–2100 are a good indicator for the
stabilization level [23,45]. We use thus total cumulative CO2
emission budgets (2000–2100) as a constraint for the long-term
target across all models. The 450 ppm CO2e target corresponds
to a cumulative emission budget of 1500 GtCO2 (2000–2100)
and the 550 ppm CO2e target to a budget of 2400 GtCO2
(2000–2100). Models with full representation of non-CO2 GHGs
reduce emissions from these sources assuming the same
CO2-equivalent price as for CO2 (see [46] Schaeffer et al. and
the supplementary material).3
2.3. Harmonization of main input assumptions
Important features of our scenario design compared to
earlier intermodel comparisons [4,6,35] are the harmonization
of assumptions for main emission drivers, such as demographic
and economic change and the future development of energy
demand. The harmonization is important to improve compara-
bility of the results. However, it also reduces the uncertainties
associated with the socio-economic drivers.
Our baseline assumptions for GDP and population corre-
spond to an intermediate pathway compared to the literature
and were derived from [47,48] (see the Supplementary
material). In order to explore sensitivity of our results to
different demand assumptions, we distinguish two contrasting
scenarios. In the reference case, global energy intensity is
following broadly historical rates of improvement, leading to an
increase in global energy demand by about a factor of two
in 2050. We explore in addition a low energy demand case
(LowEI) broadly consistent with the lower bound of demand
projections in the literature, depicting stringent efficiency
measures and behavioral changes to radically limit energy
demand [2,49,50]. The rate of energy intensity improvement in
the lowdemand scenario is about 50% higher than the historical
rate of change (see Fig. 2 in the supplementary material).
2.4. Technology sensitivity cases
In addition to sensitivity cases for energy demand, we
explore the feasibility of the transformation for a variety of
different supply-side portfolios. These supply-side cases not only
focus on possible restrictions for specific technologies that might
arise due to political concerns and public perception, but also on
implementation barriers or other concerns. Through the sensi-
tivity cases, we try to better understand the role of individual3 For applying the CO2 price to other non-CO2 GHGs (N2O, CH4, SF6, CF4,
and long-lived halocarbons), each model's default assumption on global
warming potentials is used.
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Fig. 1. Development of global GHG emissions in the “FullTech” 450 ppm CO2e scenarios with high (HST), low (LST), and optimal 2030 emission levels. Shaded
areas show ranges across long-termmodels to 2100, excluding GCAM, which shows emission development assuming high potential for negative emissions. Upper
panel (A) shows the emission development to 2030 and the maximum extent of the emission gap. Middle panel (B) illustrates the development to 2050, and
lower panel (C) to 2100.
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4 Note that POLES has a partial representation of some of the non-CO2
GHGs. In our analysis POLES is however treated as other CO2-only models,
since the coverage of non-CO2 gases is not comprehensive.
5 References to papers describing the modeling approaches can be found
in the supplementary material.
Table 1
Technology sensitivity cases and short-term emission targets assumed in the AMPERE scenarios.
Description Scenario name
Short-term targets (2030)
Low short-term target Global emissions follow a high ambition pledge pathway reaching 53 GtCO2e by 2030.
Thereafter ambitions are adjusted to meet the long-term targets (450 or 550 ppm CO2e).
“LST”
High short-term target Global emissions follow a low ambition pledge pathway reaching 61 GtCO2e by 2030.
Thereafter ambitions are adjusted to meet the long-term targets (450 or 550 ppm CO2e).
“HST”
Optimal policy Global emissions follow an optimal pathway assuming immediate introduction of climate
policies to meet the long-term targets (450 or 550 ppm CO2e). No explicit short-term
target for 2030 is assumed.
“OPT”
Technology cases
Full technology The full portfolio of technologies is available and may scale up successfully to meet the
respective climate targets.
“FullTech”
Low demand and energy intensity A combination of stringent efficiency measures and behavioral changes radically limits
energy demand, leading to a doubling of the rate of energy intensity improvements
compared to the past. The full portfolio of technologies is available on the supply side.
“LowEI”
No new nuclear No new investments into nuclear power after 2020; existing plants are fully phased out
over their life time.
“NucOff”
No CCS The technology to capture and geologically store carbon dioxide (CCS) never becomes
available. This impacts both the potential to implement lower emission options with fossil
fuels and the possibility to generate “negative emissions” when combined with bio-energy.
“NoCCS”
Limited solar and wind Limited contribution of solar and wind to 20% of total power generation, reflecting potential
implementation barriers of variable renewable energy at high penetration rates.
“LimSW”
Limited biomass Limited potential for biomass (maximum of 100 EJ/year), exploring strategies that would
avoid large-scale expansion of bioenergy and thus avoid potential competition over land
for food and fiber.
“LimBio”
Conventional solutions Limited solar, wind and biomass potentials, leading to heavy reliance on conventional
technologies such as fossil fuels in combination with CCS and/or nuclear.
“Conv”
Efficiency and renewables A low demand case assuming “No CCS” and “no new nuclear”, leading to heavy reliance on
renewables and efficiency measures.
“EERE”
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for keeping low stabilization targets within reach. Table 1
provides a brief description of each of the cases. For further
details about assumptions, see the Supplementary material.
2.5. Calculation of the climate change response
We use the reduced complexity climate and carbon-cycle
model MAGICC [51,52], version 6, for the calculation of GHG
concentrations and temperature outcomes of the scenarios.
This allows us to explore climate responses of the scenarios
based on a harmonized methodology consistent with the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth
Assessment Report (AR4). MAGICC6 is set up to probabilisti-
cally [23] span the uncertainties in carbon-cycle [53], climate
system [54] and climate sensitivity [55] of the IPCC AR4,
and is constrained by historical observations of hemispheric
land/ocean temperatures [56] and historical estimates for
ocean heat-uptake [57]. In addition to concentrations and
median temperature change, MAGICC6 is used to compute the
transient exceedance probabilities of the 2 °C temperature
target of each scenario. Temperature increase relative to
pre-industrial values is computed relative to the average
temperature between 1850 and 1875. For further details see
Schaeffer et al. [46].
2.6. Modeling frameworks
Our study compares results from nine global modeling
frameworks that participated in the AMPERE modeling
comparison (DNE21+, GCAM, IMACLIM, IMAGE, MERGE-ETL,MESSAGE-MACRO, POLES, REMIND, and WITCH). The models
represent a wide range of different approaches, including
general equilibrium, partial equilibrium, dynamic recursive,
perfect foresight, systems engineering as well as hybrid
approaches. The models further differ also with respect to
representation of sectors, greenhouse gas emissions, and the
timeframe. Seven of the models have a full representation of
the Kyoto greenhouse gases and land-use CO2 (DNE21+,
GCAM, IMAGE, MERGE-ETL, MESSAGE-MACRO, REMIND,
and WITCH), while other models focus primarily on fossil and
industrial CO2 only (IMACLIM, POLES).4 In addition, DNE21
focuses on the transition to 2050, while the other modeling
frameworks model the full century. Assumptions about near-
term emission targets for 2030 were thus estimated in CO2e as
well as CO2-only emissions, and unique cumulative CO2 budgets
were provided with and without land-use CO2 and for time
horizons up to 2050 and 2100 (see Supplementary material).
The diversity of approaches is an important asset, since it
helps us to better understand structural uncertainties, and to
focus on findings that are robust across a wide range of
methodologies. An in-depth diagnostic analysis of the models
is summarized in [58] and further details about the model
characteristics can be found in the supplementary material of
Kriegler et al. [17].5
7 As explained in the methodology section, the climate outcomes of the
scenarios were calculated with the climate model MAGICC6. MAGGIC6
shows a slightly higher emissions-to-concentration response than the
climate module of the original AMPERE models. Concentrations from
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The development of the GHG emissions in the near term
determines the required stringency of emission reductions
in the long term. In order to achieve a specific stabilization
target, any lack of short-term emissionmitigation of long-lived
greenhouse gases by, for example 2030, needs thus to be
compensated by more stringent emission reductions later in
time. In this section we discuss the implications of following
the near-term pledges for the GHG emission pathway and the
climate response in terms of temperature change.
Following a mitigation effort comparable to the pledges
results in our analysis to near-term global emission targets
between 53 GtCO2e to 61 GtCO2e for the year 2030. This
corresponds to an increase of emissions by about 6 to 22%
compared to the current emission level (50 GtCO2e), and is also
significantly above near-term emission levels from scenarios
that assume an “optimal” timing of themitigation effort to reach
450 ppm stabilization targets [8,45].
The lack of short-term mitigation leaves thus a near-term
“emission gap” compared to an immediate and “optimal”
phasing of climate policies. The size of the 2030 emission gap
depends on the assumptions about the pledges and the
stringency of the long-term target. The gap is most pro-
nounced for the long-term stabilization target of 450 ppm
CO2e (Fig. 1A). Compared to the optimal emission levels of
our ensemble, a lenient interpretation of the pledges to 2030
(our high short-term target “HST”) results in an average
emission gap across the models of 14.3 (0.7–25.6) GtCO2e by
2030 (Fig. 1A). Under the low short-term target (“LST”) the
gap is reduced to 6.6 (−7.2 to 18.2) GtCO2e, and is even
negative for some of the models.6 The HST and LST emission
levels by 2030 are broadly consistent with the long-term
target of 550 ppm CO2e without any significant emission gap
(see Fig. 3 in the Supplementary material). Our discussion in
this section thus focuses primarily on the implications for the
450 ppm CO2e target.
Embarking on the HST pathway means that about 70% of
the overall cumulative budget for 450 ppmCO2e (1500 GtCO2)
is released to the atmosphere already by 2030. This leaves only
little flexibility for the long term emission path in order to stay
within the cumulative emission target. Compared to the
optimal pathways, the HST-scenarios require thus more rapid
emission reductions over the medium term between 2030 and
2050 aswell as deeper emission reductions to lower (absolute)
levels in the long term (Fig. 1B,C). While overall dynamics in
the LST-scenarios are similar, there is more flexibility for the
emission pathways post 2030 to reach the 450 ppm CO2e
target.
Interestingly, we find that across all models the emission
gap is entirely closed already in 2050. Or in other words,
annual emissions have been reduced rapidly in all HST
scenarios to similar levels, often to even lower levels than
in the optimal climate policy scenarios toward the 450 ppm
CO2e target (Fig. 1B). Despite the delays in mitigation in the
HST scenarios, GHG emissions by 2050 in most models reach
thus comparatively low levels and cluster around a narrow
band of 18–28 GtCO2e by 2050. This poses a significant6 Numbers in parentheses correspond to the full range of the gap across all
models.challenge for the HST scenarios, as it leaves only 20 years
(2030 to 2050) for a fundamental transformation of the
global energy-economic system. One model in our set finds
such a rapid transformation not feasible under any of the
assumed demand or technology variations (IMACLIM), and
another model (IMAGE) finds the transformation only
possible if energy demand is comparatively low (“LowEI”
case). On the other hand, the GCAM model is indicating that
emissions by 2050 may reach significantly higher levels than
in the other models (in the HST, LST as well as in the case
of optimal policies, see Fig. 1B). These comparatively high
short-term emissions are primarily due to the model's high
potential for negative emissions from Bio-CCS (biomass in
combination with carbon capture and storage) and affores-
tation. Utilizing such high negative emission potentials
would require scaling up bio-energy in combination with
CCS to about 800 EJ over the course of the century (by
comparison, the current global primary energy use of all
energy carriers is about 500 EJ). With more limited potential
for negative emissions due to, for example, limited biomass
availability, GCAM must lower 2050 emissions to similar
levels as the other models in our study (see Fig. 4 in the
Supplementary material). For more information on the
importance of negative emissions on the timing of GHG
mitigation and the attainability of low stabilization targets
see also [34,45,59–61], and for a further analysis of the role of
negative emissions in our study, see [18].
Atmospheric GHG concentrations span a relatively wide
range across the scenarios (Table 2). This is partly due to our
scenarios set-up, which defines the long-term target in terms
of cumulative CO2 emissions. The realized long-term concen-
trations differ thus across the models, and depend on
concurrent reductions of non-CO2 gases and the assumed
development of aerosol emissions (in particular sulfur). The
full range across the “450 ppm” AMPERE scenarios is 450 to
520 ppm CO2e (overall 66% uncertainty range, including
carbon-cycle and climate-system uncertainties). The median
across the AMPERE “450 ppm” scenarios is 480 ppm CO2-e,
and lies thus slightly above the target concentration.7
The maximum temperature change in the 450 ppm CO2e
scenario is below 2 °C for most of the models with an overall
median of the estimates around 1.9 °C for optimal policies
and around 2.0 °C for the HST and LST scenarios. Scenarios
with high potential of negative emissions and thus larger
overshoot in emissions in the medium term (Fig. 1B) show
the biggest transient temperature response of up to 2.5 °C.
By comparison, temperature increases on average to about
2.4 °C in our 550 ppm scenarios.
For assessing the likelihood of the scenarios for the 2 °C
target, we conduct a probabilistic analysis using MAGICC6
(see Schaeffer et al. [46]). We find that the HST scenarios
with a long-term target of 450 ppm CO2e show on average a
5 percentage point higher probability to exceed the 2 °CMAGICC6 as reported in Table 2 are thus slightly above the indigenous
concentrations that were calculated by many of the original AMPERE models
(see also the AMPERE database: https://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/
AMPEREDB/).
Table 2
GHG emissions, atmospheric concentrations, and temperature consequences in the “FullTech” scenarios. Numbers correspond to the median and the full range
across the scenarios. Note that for the climate simulations, emissions were harmonized to the same base year using inventories from [76,77].
CO2 emissions CO2e emissions Cumulative CO2 emissions CO2e concentrations Temperature change Probability of exceeding 2 °C
(2030) (2030) (2005–2100) (2100) (Max) (Max)
GtCO2 GtCO2e GtCO2 ppm °C %
Baseline 53 (50–67) 71 (68–83) 6268 (5670–8755) 1143 (1023–1338) 4.6 (3.5–5.9) 100 (100–100)
450 optimal 31 (24–45) 46 (35–60) 1330 (1242–1350) 485 (453–522) 1.9 (1.5–2.4) 42 (26–84)
450 LST 39 (37–42) 53 (53–53) 1335 (1263–1379) 488 (455–524) 2.0 (1.5–2.5) 45 (28–84)
450 HST 46 (44–49) 61 (60–61) 1344 (1274–1382) 484 (452–520) 2.0 (1.6–2.5) 47 (28–84)
550 optimal 40 (31–47) 55 (49–63) 2234 (2211–2250) 569 (524–618) 2.3 (1.8–3.0) 75 (64–93)
550 LST 39 (37–42) 53 (52–53) 2238 (2199–2283) 570 (525–620) 2.3 (1.8–3.0) 75 (66–93)
550 HST 46 (44–49) 61 (60–61) 2235 (2190–2269) 567 (523–617) 2.3 (1.8–3.0) 76 (66–93)
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to an increase in the probability of exceeding 2 °C from about
42% in the optimal scenarios to about 47% in the HST cases,
which is consistent with the small but noticeable higher
median warming noted further above. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the risks to exceed the 2 °C target are by far the
highest (about 84%, see Table 2) in scenarios of our ensemble
that are characterized by a large overshoot and where
emissions continue to increase even above the HST level
(GCAM 450 ppm CO2e).
That the HST emission levels lead to only modest
increases in probability to exceed 2 °C in our analysis, is
influenced by the fact that 1) the HST scenarios reduce
emissions very rapidly in the medium term (2030–2050),
and 2) some models were not able to stay within the
predefined budget for the HST case. Obviously, the emission
pathways from these infeasible runs are not part of our
sample. Our estimates miss thus the “climate penalty” from
these models, which would have exceeded the long-term
target and thus would have shown higher temperature
response. Schaeffer et al. [46] find in addition that all HST
scenarios are leading to a faster short-term warming, posing
an increased challenge to adaptation efforts.4. Implications for the pace of the transformation
An important characteristic of the energy sector is its
long-lived capital stock, with lifetimes for infrastructure and
energy conversion facilities of 30–60 years and sometimes
longer. This longevity translates into high inertia in energy
supply systems, which impedes rapid transformation
[2,62,63]. It explains also the path-dependency of the system
[64] and that once technological change is introduced into
one direction, it is becoming increasingly difficult to change
its course [32,65]. Decisions about the stringency of GHG
policies over the next two decades are thus critical for the
overall pace at which the transformation to low emissions
needs to occur. Lack of near term climate policies may also
add to the transformation challenge by increasing the inertia
of the system due to additional lock-in of fossil-intensive
infrastructures over the coming years. While Bertram et al.
[66] and Eom et al. [18] explore lock-in effects of the pledge
pathways in great detail, we focus in this section on the
implications for the required pace of the transformation.
Specifically, we explore the consequences of the HST and LSTtargets for the overall pace of CO2 emission reductions and
underlying energy system changes post 2030.
The previous section has shown the critical importance of
the emission reductions by 2050 in order to close the near
term emission gap of the HST and LST pathways. We thus
focus on the required annual emission reductions over the
time frame between 2030 and 2050 (Fig. 2), and compare
these to historical precedents for various different countries
where emission declines have been observed in the past.
The average global CO2 emission reduction rate in our
optimal 450 ppm CO2e scenarios is about 3.7% per year
between 2030 and 2050. Most models cluster in a relatively
narrow band of 2.8–4.2% per year with a full uncertainty
range of 1.2 to 5.5%.
Following the HST pathways to 2030 requires an acceler-
ation of the global rate of emission reductions to 2050 by
almost a factor of two compared to the optimal policy
scenarios. The average emission reduction rate in the HST
scenarios, for example, is about 7% per year between 2030 and
2050. Also the uncertainty band is shifted considerably to 1.3–
10% per year as compared to the optimal policy cases (with the
majority of HST scenarios clustering around 5.9–8.5% per year).
The decarbonization of the LST scenarios to 2050 is also more
rapid than in the optimal policy cases, but somewhat less fast
than in the case of HST scenarios (Fig. 2).
These high reduction rates are achieved by fundamental and
rapid structural changes of the energy system to bridge the
emission gap by 2050 (Bertram et al. [66]). Sustained long-term
decarbonization rates to the end of the century are generally
slower than the reduction rates between 2030 and 2050 (Fig. 2).
However, scenarios that strongly rely on negative emissions as,
for example, illustrated by the GCAM model, are an exception.
While negative emissions in the long term allow compensating
for relatively higher short-term emissions, they also translate
into the need for sustaining higher reduction rates in the second
half of the century. The GCAM model thus shows higher
long-term reduction rates (5% per year between 2030 and
2100), which roughly doubles the rate of other models in our
ensemble.
While stringent climate policies have so far not been
introduced in most parts of the world, it is useful to bring
these global reduction rates into perspective using historical
rates achieved by some countries. A distribution of national
historical 20-year average annual emission reduction rates is
presented in Fig. 2 [67]. Public support of nuclear power has
led to annual declines in emissions in France of about 2% per
8 Low-carbon energy includes renewables, nuclear and fossil fuels in
combination with carbon capture and storage (CCS). Note that the AMPERE
models treat renewables and nuclear as carbon neutral, and thus do not
account for the associated life-cycle emissions during, e.g., the production of
the technologies. Technological progress in especially uranium enrichment
has recently yielded energy intensity reductions that have signiﬁcantly
lowered the GHG footprint of nuclear power [68]. This effect can be taken
into account only in models that have a representation of nuclear fuel
processing technologies (such as GCAM, MESSAGE and DNE21+).
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observed in Sweden from 1974 to 2000 as a result of policies
in response to the 1973 oil crisis and the greening of the
Swedish energy system thereafter (2–3% per year). Similar
growth rates can also be observed in Denmark and some
other countries. While the decline rates of these countries
are broadly consistent with the global rates from the majority
of the optimal policy scenarios (2.8–4.2% per year), we
emphasize that they were achieved at a completely different
scale. What can be introduced at the national scale is only a
weak indicator for the global challenge, which requires that
all major emitting countries together, characterized by very
different local circumstances, would need to accomplish such
rapid changes. With this caveat in mind, it is noteworthy that
higher emission reduction rates observed historically have
primarily been achieved only due to economic recessions,
as for example the collapse of the Soviet Union, which
resulted in emission decline rates between 2 and 4% per year
for Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries.
Achieving global emission reduction rates due to dedicated
policy interference on the order of 5.9–8.5% as required by
the majority of the HST pathways is thus unprecedented even
at the national scale. Analysis by Bertram et al. [66] and Eom
et al. [18] shows that reducing emissions at this pace will
require on the one hand the premature phase-out of a large
number of fossil power plants, while on the other hand
low-carbon technologies would need to be scaled up rapidly.
The enormous challenge of such rapid transformations is also
indicated by the fact that two of the AMPERE models cannotreach the target once short-term emissions increase to the
HST level.
Achieving these emission reductions requires the substi-
tution of fossil fuels by low-carbon alternatives, such as
renewables, nuclear and the application of CCS (both in
combination with biomass and fossil fuel conversion tech-
nologies). The ultimate share of low-carbon energy is
dictated by the fact that global emissions will eventually
need to be reduced to about zero or even become negative by
the end of the century in order to attain the 450 ppm CO2e
target. Scenarios that try to reduce the concentrations to such
low levels require thus an almost complete transformation of
the system before the end of the century. In terms of the
required long-term share of low-carbon energy, there is thus
hardly any difference between our scenarios.8 The median
across the HST, LST and the optimal policy scenarios all show
an increase of the low-carbon share to 90–95% by 2100
(Fig. 3). This compares to the current share of low-carbon
energy of about 15%, which consists primarily of hydro and
9 Note that the analysis of mitigation costs focuses on the results from the
long-term models that cover a time-horizon of the full century. Results for
the short-termmodels can be found in the AMPERE database: https://secure.
iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AMPEREDB/.
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oping world.
While the end-point of the energy transition is deter-
mined by the stabilization target, there are significant
differences across the scenarios with respect to the pace at
which low-carbon energy options need to be scaled up over
time.
The low-carbon energy share is projected to double every
20 years in the optimal 450 ppm scenarios. This corresponds to
a world-wide increase of the contribution of low-carbon
energy to about 30% by 2030, and to about 60% by 2050
(Fig. 3) — a pace that is also consistent with other internation-
ally proposed global energy targets, such as those from the
UN's Sustainable Energy for All initiative [69,70] that has
proposed a doubling of renewable energy shares by 2030 as
one of its main objectives.
The comparatively modest policy signal of the pledges
translates in the HST and LST pathways to much lower shares
of low carbon energy in the near term. Particularly in the HST
scenario, there is almost no progress with respect to the
share of low-carbon energy, which remains at roughly
current levels by 2030. The pledges result thus not only in
an emission gap, but also to a pronounced “low-carbon
energy gap” (see Bertram et al. [66]).
This low-carbon energy gap has severe implications for
the upscaling needs of low-carbon options to 2050. During
the period between 2030 and 2050 the share of low-carbon
energy needs to more than quadruple in the HST pathways
(from about 15 to 65%, see Fig. 3). In other words, about half
of the global energy infrastructure would need to be replaced
in a narrow time frame of two decades only. This would
require not only double digit growth rates from many
mitigation technologies, but also the premature replacement
of existing fossil fuel capacities after 2030. Even the LST
pathways require almost a tripling of the zero-carbon share
between 2030 and 2050, an effort, which is significantly
faster than the smooth transition of the optimal policy
pathways. Eom et al. [18] analyze the associated future
“upscaling needs” of individual technologies in terms of
physical deployment measures, and compare those to
observed historical rates. Their analysis shows that expansion
requirements of capacity in the HST pathways might become
particularly dramatic, for example, for some of the renewable
technologies (for further details see [18]).
The comparatively modest policy signal of the pledge
pathways poses thus a twin-challenge. On the one hand,
they lead to a further lock-in of the energy system into
fossil-intensive infrastructure, and on the other hand they
reduce the flexibility of the energy system by requiring a
much more rapid system transformation in the medium term
(to 2050).
5. Mitigation costs and feasibility
This section presents implications of the pathways for
the mitigation costs and the feasibility of the transformation.
In order to assess the importance of different mitigation
technologies to reach the climate targets, we extend the
discussion in this section beyond the so-called “FullTech”
scenarios, and present also the results for the technology
sensitivity cases (Table 1).Owing to methodological differences of the models, costs
are presented and compared for two different metrics. For
models that calculate macroeconomic impacts (REMIND,
MESSAGE, MERGE-ETL, WITCH, and IMACLIM), mitigation
costs are measured in terms of GDP losses. For other models
(GCAM, IMAGE, and POLES) we report costs in terms of the
area under the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve. The
two cost metrics might not be directly comparable, but tend
to be of similar order of magnitude in models that report both
dimensions.9
As shown by the diagnostic analysis of Kriegler et al. [58],
models that have a higher technology resolution and that
tend to be more “flexible” in terms of their mitigation
response, are generally also reporting lower overall mitiga-
tion costs. Vice versa, models that tend to have lower
flexibility report comparatively higher costs. Mitigation
costs thus vary significantly across models. Despite this
apparent uncertainty surrounding the individual estimates,
however, the full ensemble of models reveals a number of
robust insights.
Mitigation costs in the 450 ppm scenarios, expressed as
the net present value (NPV) over the course of the full
century, are generally higher than in the 550 ppm scenarios
by at least a factor of two (Fig. 4A). Similar to earlier model
comparisons (e.g., [4]), we find thus significant differences in
abatement costs between the scenarios that reach 550 and
450 ppm targets.
Another important finding is that the cost-implications of
the near-term targets (LST and HST) are relatively small in the
550 ppm scenarios. This might be less of a surprise, given that
the short-term emission pathways of the pledges (LST and
HST) are rather similar to the observed emission trends of the
optimal 550 ppm scenarios (see Fig. 3 in the Supplementary
material). In other words, LST and HST pathways are broadly
consistent with 550 ppm, and there is thus no big need to
compensate for the lack of short-term emission reductions that
may translate to significant implications for the mitigation
costs.
By contrast, the pledge pathways (LST and HST) have,
however, major implications for the costs of meeting the
450 ppm target (see panel b of Fig. 4). For example, the
median mitigation costs across models increase in the case of
the HST target by about 30% compared to the median of the
optimal policy cases. The full range across models is between
a 1% and 55% increase compared to the optimal case. Recall
also that two models found that it was not possible to reach
450 ppm CO2e from the HST pathway. Costs from these
models are thus not included. Following the low short-term
target (LST) increases costs across the models on average by
about 7% for the full century (full range is between 2 and
20%). The costs are discounted over the full century with a
discount rate of 5%. They include the mitigation costs up to
the year 2030 as well as the long-term costs to 2100. These
are thus net costs, fully taking into account near-term cost–
benefits of the modest mitigation effort of the pledge
pathways to 2030. Overall, our results show the paramount
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the costs-effectiveness over the entire century in order to
reach the 450 ppm CO2e target (Fig. 4A,B).
Limiting the costs of emission mitigation to a specific
maximum threshold and avoiding possible economic discon-
tinuities have been suggested by earlier studies as metrics
to enhance political acceptability of emission reduction targets
for the post-Copenhagen negotiations [16,71]. We thus also
explore mitigation costs over time, and specifically look into
the differences across the scenarios with respect to peak or
maximummitigation costs of the 450 ppm scenarios (Fig. 5).10
We find that impacts of the HST and LST pathways on peak
costs to be even more pronounced than the NPV over the
century. In the HST pathways the maximum mitigation cost
increases on average by about 50% across themodels compared
to the optimal case (full range across models is between 3 to
110%, see Fig. 5). Also in the LST scenarios, the peak mitigation
costs are substantially higher than in the optimal cases
(compare, e.g., Figs. 4b and 5). The pronounced increase in
the peak costs occurs in most models between 2030 and 2050,
i.e., the time-frame where HST and LST pathways need to
achieve a fundamental and rapid transformation to reach10 The peak (or maximum) costs in our study are deﬁned as the maximum
decadal mitigation costs (as % of the baseline GDP) for the timeframe
2030–2100. Fig. 5 shows the ratio between the peak costs of the LST/HST and
OPT scenarios. Costs presented here differ thus from the transitional growth
reduction metric (deﬁned as the maximum reduction of decadal consump-
tion growth) that has been used by other studies [16].the long-term target of 450 ppm. The impact of the pledge
pathways on the mitigation cost is the smallest in models that
have the biggest flexibility to compensate high near term
emissions through large contributions of negative emissions in
the second half of the century (e.g., GCAM).11
Similar to other cost metrics, we observe considerable
differences across the model estimates for the associated
marginal abatement costs or carbon prices (see Fig. 9 in
the Supplementary material). For example, in the optimal
450 ppm scenarios carbon prices differ by about an order of
magnitude, from less than 100 $/tCO2 tomore than 1000 $/tCO2
by the year 2050. There is strong agreement across the
estimates, however, that the price of carbon would increase
considerably in the HST cases by at least 50% (up to 300%)
compared to the optimal scenarios. The effect in GCAM is again
smaller than in the other models.
Comparing our results to the scenarios of the modeling
comparison project LIMITS [27–30] further emphasizes the
importance of the near-term emission reductions to 2030.
LIMITS has been conducted in parallel to AMPERE, and puts
its main focus on the implications of fragmented policies to
2020. The study finds that 2020 targets have, in contrast to
2030, only limited implications for the mitigation costs (even
during the medium-term transition phase). This finding is
important, since it illustrates the critical role of climate11 Transient costs as well as other scenario data of the AMPERE scenarios
can be downloaded from the interactive AMPERE web-database at: https://
secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/AMPEREDB/.
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18 K. Riahi et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 8–23policies between 2020 and 2030 in order to reach low
stabilization targets.
The availability and future potential of mitigation technol-
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which assumes that the full portfolio of technologies is
available at their full potential. In order to explore also the
critical question of the attainability of the targets, we track
also the number of “infeasible” model runs. The focus of this
section is on the 450 ppm scenarios and the differences in
costs between the optimal policy scenarios and the HST target
(Fig. 8 in the Supplementary material shows in addition also
the results for the LST-450 ppm scenarios).
An “infeasible” scenario means that a specific model in
our set could not find a solution given a particular combination
of short- and long-term targets. Infeasibilities may occur due
to different reasons, such as lack of mitigation options to
stay within the cumulative emission constraints; binding
constraints for the diffusion of technologies or extremely high
price signals under which the modeling framework cannot be
solved anymore. Infeasibility is thus an indication that under a
specific model parameterization the transformation cannot
be achieved. It provides useful context to understand technical
or economic concerns. These concerns need to be strictly
differentiated from the feasibility of the transformation in the
real world, which hinges on a number of other factors, such as
political and social concerns that might render feasible model
solutions unattainable in the realworld.While theremight also
be solutions in the real world that are not anticipated by the
models, we interpret infeasibility across a large number of
models as an indication of increased risk that the transforma-
tion may not be attainable due to technical or economic
concerns. For a comprehensive overview of model infeasibil-
ities, including a comparison to technology sensitivity cases of
EMF27 [73], see the Supplementary material.
Our results show that the mitigation costs increase as the
deployment of supply-side technologies becomes restricted
(Fig. 6). This increase in costs (compared to the “FullTech”
scenarios) can be interpreted as the opportunity cost or
value of different options to reach the long-term climate
target.
We discuss first the cost implications of the technology
sensitivity cases for the optimal pathways shown in Fig. 6A.
While the costs across themodels again show a relatively wide
range, there seems to be a clear ranking of different options.
The phase-out of nuclear has the smallest implications for the
overall mitigation costs, followed by limited solar and wind
deployment (LimSW), limited biomass potential (LimBio), and
finally the elimination of CCS as a mitigation option (NoCCS),
which shows the largest increase inmitigation costs associated
with achieving the 450 ppm target (Fig. 6A). Strategies that
emphasize binary preferences for either conventional technol-
ogies (Conv) with limited contribution of renewables, or on
the other extreme, efficiency measures and renewable tech-
nologies (EERE), show also a relatively high increase in costs.
These results emphasize the importance ofmaintaining a broad
portfolio of available technologies for cost—effectively achiev-
ing the 450 ppm target (see also [2,41,73]). Biomass and
particularly CCS are of central importance for keeping mitiga-
tion costs relatively low, which has also been emphasized by
other studies [2,34,74]. A phase-out of nuclear, on the other
hand, seems to have only modest consequences for the overall
mitigation costs (see also [75]).
Fig. 6B shows the cost and feasibility implications of the
technology sensitivity cases when trying to reach the 450 ppmCO2e target in the HST cases. Generally, the ranking of different
mitigation options in terms of costs is similar to the ranking
observed for the optimal 450 ppm CO2e scenarios. The cost
implications of restricting the technology portfolio in the HST
cases are, however, much more pronounced than in the
optimal pathways. Moreover, for many technology sensitivity
cases, the majority of the models can no longer find a feasible
solutionwhen the short-term emissions climb to the HST level.
Compared to the optimal policy cases, the HST pathways show
thus significant risks that the 450 ppm target is getting out of
reach. For example, more than 75% of all models are unable
to achieve the 450 ppm target in the “NoCCS” or “EERE” cases.
About half of themodels can no longer achieve the target in the
“Conv” case or when biomass is constrained, and more than
25% of the models indicate that it is no longer feasible to
achieve the HST target with either low solar and wind
deployment or the phase-out of nuclear.
Following the HST pledge pathways thus narrows policy
choices, and increases the risks that some of the currently
optional technologies, such as the large-scale deployment
of bioenergy, will become “a must” by 2030 in order to
achieve low stabilization targets. Our results show also that
the technical and economic risks that the 450 ppm target
becomes unattainable are particularly high in the case that
CCS would not become available. Following the HST pledge
pathway would thus require that current obstacles to the
deployment of CCS are resolved [37].
Another important finding illustrated by our results is the
paramount importance of energy efficiency and behavioral
and other measures to limit energy demand. The “LowEI”
case achieves the 450 ppm target with the lowest costs
across all sensitivity cases and models, and it is also the only
case where the target is found attainable by 89% of the
models even if the HST pledge pathway is followed to 2030.
Dedicated measures to reduce energy intensity and to limit
energy demand may thus not only reduce the cost of the
transformation, but can also hedge against the risk that low
stabilization targets might get out of reach if the world is
following a pledge pathway to 2030 in the near term.
6. Conclusions and discussion
We find that following a mitigation effort comparable to the
pledges would result in near-term global emissions between
53 GtCO2e to 61 GtCO2e for the year 2030. These emission levels
are significantly higher than emissions in low stabilization
scenarios with optimal and immediate introduction of climate
policies to reach 450 ppm CO2e. Similar to earlier studies, we
find thus that the pledges would result in a near-term “emission
gap”.
The explicit consideration of short-term emission targets
has enabled us to go beyond earlier modeling comparisons and
to directly assess the consequences of these near term targets.
We find that there is only a small window of time between
2030 and 2050 in order to close the emission gap. This implies
only little flexibility for the system to compensate for the lack
of emission reductions in the short-term with pronounced
implications for the required pace of emission reductions and
the energy system transformation. We find, for example, that
following anHST pledge pathway to 2030would require across
most models a doubling of the pace of emission reductions
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one hand, the high near-term emission pathway of the pledges
creates a lock-in of the energy system into fossil-intensive
infrastructure, and on the other hand they reduce the flexibility
of the energy system by requiring a much more rapid system
transformation.
Following the pledge pathways to 2030 has also major
implications for the mitigation costs. Despite large uncer-
tainty across models, we find that on average the net
mitigation costs for 2010–2100 may increase by about 30%
in the case of the HST pledge pathways. Because of the
need to massively accelerate the transformation, peak costs
between 2030 and 2100 are on average even higher by about
50% in the HST scenarios. Models with large potential of
negative emissions show the biggest flexibility to compen-
sate the lack of short-term emission reductions associated
with the pledge pathways. Negative emissions may help thus
to keep long-term targets within reach at relatively modest
costs. However, the tradeoff is a significant increase in the
risk of exceeding the temperature change objective of 2 °C.
Specifically, the probability of exceeding the target increases
to about 85% compared to the median across models of 45
to 47%.
A further finding of our analysis is that the pledge
pathways increase the technical and economic risks that the
450 ppm CO2e becomes unattainable. We derive this conclu-
sion through a systematic technology sensitivity analysisexploring the feasibility and cost implications of different
technology restrictions. A head-line conclusion from this
analysis is that the pledge pathway, in particular the HST
pathway, narrows policy choices and increases the risks that
some of the currently optional technologies, such as the
large-scale deployment of biomass or CCS, will become “a
must” by 2030 in order to achieve low stabilization targets.
Finally, an important finding illustrated by our results is
the paramount importance of energy efficiency and behav-
ioral and other measures to limit energy demand. These
measures not only reduce the cost of the transformation, but
can also hedge against the risk that low stabilization targets
might become unattainable when following a high emission
pathway to 2030 in the near term.
Overall, our analysis shows that following a pledge
pathway to 2030 would raise a number of concerns: 1) it
would increase the overall mitigation costs, particularly in
the medium term; 2) it would reduce the system flexibility
by requiring more rapid energy transformations; and 3) it
would increase the risk that stringent long-term targets, such
as 450 ppm CO2e, become unattainable because of technical
and economic reasons. Considering also other possible
barriers to GHG emission reductions, such as social and
political constraints, the transformation may be even more
difficult than assessed by the scenarios in our study. These
findings have important implications for the international
negotiations and the Durban action plan, which aim at
21K. Riahi et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 90 (2015) 8–23establishing post 2020 emission targets. Our analysis shows
that the level of emissions in 2030 will be decisive in order to
keep the 2 °C objective within reach. Further deep cuts in
GHG emissions will be required by 2050 in order to avoid
large-scale overshoot of the objective in the 21st century.
Continuing on a mitigation path to 2030 with a similar
stringency as the 2020 pledges will increase the risks that
society will fall short in achieving this objective.
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